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INTRODUCTION
When countries restrict international investment, what may result
are segmented markets where assets are valued differently by domestic
and foreign investors. The degree to which restrictions act as barriers
depends on the type of investment activity these countries restrict and
whether the restrictions are binding. Specifically, this study investigates
how U.S. investors view Philippine barriers to international investments
and the recent steps taken by the Philippine government in liberalizing
these restrictions. In particular, we use data on the First Philippine Fund
(FPF), a closed-end country fund traded at the New York Stock Exchange,
to provide evidence on whether existing international investment restrictions
have effectively segmented the Philippine capital market from the
international capital markets. We test whether restrictions on international
investments in the Philippines are effective and whether the announced
relaxation of these restrictions is deemed important by U.S. investors. This
we do by examining if announcements of changes in the investment
restrictions in the Philippines are related to changes in the premiums and
discounts of the FPF closed-end country fund.
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and "B" shares. 2 "A" shares are reserved for Filipino nationals, while "B"
shares can be purchased by both foreign and local investors, a Other than
this ownership restriction, there are no distinctions between the rights,
preferences and limitations of the two classes of shares. However, the FPF
is the only country fund permitted by the Philippine government to invest
in "A" shares of domestic companies that are otherwise available only to
Philippine nationals. This feature makes the FPF an easily accessible
alternative to direct investment in the restricted Philippine capital market.
Similar to their domestic counterparts, dosed-end foreign country
funds can trade at premiums or discounts over their Net Asset Values
(NAVs). However, in contrast to domestic closed-end funds, the foreign
country fund's NAV is not determined in the same market as its share
price but by the prices of the underlying securities traded in the foreign
market. Given that country funds and their underlying assets are close
substitutes, then, if capital markets are integrated internationally, a closed-
end country fund's shares and its underlying assets should have similar
risk. However, Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) and Hietala (1989) argue
that barriers to international investment can cause the expected returns
on assets of equal risk to differ across countries. Based on these models,
nonzero country fund premiums imply some market segmentation.
Eun and Janakiramanan (1986) and Hietala (1989) assume
quantitative limits on cross-ownership of assets as the form of international
investment barrier. In their models, a foreign country has two classes
of shares: (a) restricted shares that only the foreign country's nationals
can buy and (b) unrestricted shares that can be purchased by both the
foreign country's nationals and overseas investors. The foreign country's
government imposes limits on the fraction of the unrestricted shares.
They show that when these limits are binding, the unrestricted shares sell
at a premium relative to the restricted shares with the premium depending
on the covariance matrix of returns and investor preferences. The assets
underlying the closed-end country funds are analogous to the restricted
shares, while the country funds' shares themselves can be considered as
the unrestricted shares. Thus, these models suggest that imposition of
binding quantitative restrictions will increase the price-to-NAV ratio of the
fund investing in that country above the level prevailing in the absence
of such restrictions. 42,56 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
An intuitive explanation, of the preceding inferences is as follows.
Suppose that a particular country legally prohibits foreign investors from
directly purchasing its local equity securities. Assume that the only means
by which a foreign investor can gain access to this country's equity market
is through a closed-end fund, which is allowed to invest in the local
securities. This fund will, most likely, have value to diversification-minded
foreign investors and possibly sell at a premium over its NAV. s Therefore,
when the restrictions are relaxed and direct purchase of the securities
underlying the fund becomes easier, the fund is likely to have lesser value
for the foreign investor. Consequently, the demand for the fund's shares
decreases and thus the fund's shares are likely to sell at a lesser premium
than before. At the same time, it is possible that foreign investors shift
their capital from the country fund to direct purchases of the host country's
equities as a result of liberalization. This increases the demand for the
host country's equities, which in turn increases the NAV of the country
fund. This reinforces the effect of reducing the premium or increasing
the discount on the country fund. _
In summary, the preceding models imply that the price-to-NAV ratios
of country funds can be affected by barriers to international investments if
these restrictions are effective. This allows us to test whether changes in
investment restrictions are associated with changes in the country fund's
premiums or discounts. In particular, the preceding models suggest that,
ceteris paribus, an announcement of a tightening of existing barriers
increases the premium of or reduces the discount on a closed-end country
fund investing in a country if this country's international investment
restrictions are effective, or an announcement of a liberalization of the
restrictions reduces the premium of, or increases the discount on, the fund.
Tests of these hypotheses do not necessitate an underlying asset pricing
model nor do they require measures of the effectiveness of the barriers to
international investments. This is because when international capital
markets are fully integrated, the shares of a closed-end country fund and
its underlying assets should have similar risk. Consequently the fund's
share price should be priced like domestic funds.
Using this theoretical framework, Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal andUNITE AND BEVERIDGE:CAPITALMARKETLIBERALIZATION 25'7
Wheatley (1990) examine whether a relation exists between announcements
of changes in investment restrictions and changes in closed-end country
funds' premiums and discounts using weekly data from May 1981 to
January 1989 for five funds trading in New York. For four country funds,
they find in their sample a significant decrease in the fund's premiums
(or increase in discounts) either in anticipation of or during the three
weeks surrounding the announcement of a liberalization of investment
restrictions. Overall, their results indicate that changes in country fund
premiums are sensitive to announcements of changes in foreign country
regulations that restrict investments. They find that across all country
funds an announcement of a relaxation of investment restrictions is
significantly associated with a 6.8 percent decline in the price-net asset
value ratio during the event period, This suggests that government-imposed
barriers to international investments have been effective in segmenting
international capital markets. This is because announced changes in
international investment restrictions, on average, would have had no
impact on fund premiums if the restrictions had not been effective.
Although not conclusive, there is some evidence that country fund.s
that invest in markets with difficult access have relatively high premiums.
For example, Bonser-Neal et al. (1990) find that closed-end country funds
investing in markets which restrict foreign access have traded on average
at premiums while funds investing in the less restricted markets have
traded on average at discounts. However, they doubt if the relationship
between the severity of barriers to international investments and the level
of a country fund's premium is monotonic since some kinds investing m
countries which impose restrictions on foreign investment have traded on
average at discounts. Likewise, Bodurtha, Kim and Lee (1995) find in their
sample that, while most country funds trade at an average discount, some
funds that operate in countries which have very strict foreign ownership
restrictions have traded at average premiums. Moreover, they find that
funds investing in securities of countries with greater foreign ownership
restrictions tend to have higher premiums or smaller discounts. However,
they find that some funds investing in countries with strict foreign ownership
restrictions, including the Philippines, exhibit discounts on average.
We would like to emphasize at the outset that the focus of this
study is only on how regulator?" changes in Philippine international258 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
investment restrictions have affected the premiums and discounts of the
FPF closed-end country fund. 7 This paper does not seek to explain why
the FPF closed-end country, fund trades at a premium or discount nor does
it investigate the determinants of this fund's premium or discount and
the extent of international diversification benefits that the fund offers.
Readers are referred to the studies of Chang, Eun and Kolodny (1995),
Bodurtha et al. (1.995), Hardouvelis, La Porta and Wizman (1994), Johnson,
Schneeweis and Dinning (1993}, and Diwan, Errunza and Senbet 1993)
as they address these issues.
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The initial sample comprises weekly closing prices and NAVs of the
FPF covering the period November 24, 1989 to December 29, 1995. 8 Both
fund share price and NAV are reported in U.S. dollars and are collected
from The Wall Street Journal. Data on the amount of dividends and capital
gains distributions, including the announcement and ex-dividend dates,
were obtained from Standard & Poors NYSE Stock Reports. Like other
closed-end country funds, the FPF's NAV is valued in local currency as
of Friday's close in the foreign country and translated into U.S. dollars
using the exchange rate in effect at that time. The fund's weekly {percentage)
premiums over the net asset value are constructed as:
,PD, = L NA V_ x 100
where PD, = premium (discount) of the fund at the end of week t
SP_ = stock price of the fund at end of week t
NAy = net asset value of the fund at end of week t
The reported fund prices and net asset values are only approximately
synchronous because a difference of 17 hours exist between the Philippine
stock exchange close and New York's close. 9
Figure 1 plots the fund's premium over the initial sample period, l°
The plot shows that during the first four months after launch {from
November 24, 1989 to March 23, 1990), the FPF was trading at a premium
after which the fund was and has since been selling at a discount over
its NAV.UNITE AND BEVERIDGE:CAPITALMARKETLIBERALIZATION 2,59
Figure 1. First Philippine Fund Weekly Premium (Discount)









The FPF was launched in November 1989 when the Philippine
market was booming amid hopes that the country was finally set to join
the ranks of Asia's newly industrialized countries. More importantly, as
discussed earlier, the FPF is the only country fund permitted by the
Philippine government to invest in "A" shares of companies that are
otherwise available only to Philippine nationals. This possibly explains the
premium when the fund was launched. However, within several weeks
p
of the launching of the fund, right wing factions of the military attempted
to overthrow the Philippine government. This adversely affected the
Philippine stock market causing the Manila Stock Exchange Composite
Index to fall by 26 percent within one week after trading began. In
response to the coup attempt and combined with the perception that
prices of Philippine securities had been inflated by speculators in anticipation
of the fund's entry into the market, the FPF management adopted a policy260 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
of proceeding cautiously into the market. The fund remained primarily
in cash (nonpeso cash and cash equivalents as U.S. Treasury bonds) such
that total investments in Philippine common stocks stood at 0.3 percent
of total net assets of the fund as of December 31, 1989, gradually increasing
to 24.5 percent by June 30, 1990, and then to 27.4 percent as of December
31, 1990. j._Clearly, changes in premium during the first four months had
more to do With investor sentiment in the U.S. than with the economic
fundamentals in the Philippines. 12
Therefore, following Johnson et al. (1993), we exclude from the
sample the four-month period immediately following the initial public
offering of the FPF. By doing so, the fund's share price (and consequently
the fund's percentage premium/discount) is thus not biased by initial
marketing efforts and speculation by local holders of Philippine securities
or by the sentiment of fund investors. Moreover, changes in the premium
confounded by the effect of the December 1989 attempted coup is avoided.
Consequently, the adjusted sample used for this study covers the period
March 30, 1990 to December 29, 1995.13
Figure 2 shows the FPF's weekly discount over the adjusted sample
period March 30, 1990 to December 29, 1995. On average, the FPF has
traded at a discount of 19 percent over this sample period, suggesting a
sizable variation in the fund's discount over time. The following section
discusses the procedure for testing whether some of this variation can be




The criteria for selecting the events related to changes in barriers
to international investment in the Philippines is as follows. Following
Bonser-Neal et al. (1990}, we consider two types of regulatory, changes:
(a} changes in restrictions that directly affect or signal changes in the
ability of foreign investors to acquire shares of Philippine companies or
the ability of local investors to invest outside the Philippines (e.g., capital
controls affecting direct investment and portfolio investment) and (b)UNITE AND BEVERIDGE: CAPITAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION 261
Figure 2. First Philippine Fund Weekly Premium (Discount)













changes in restrictions that affect the ability of investors to obtain the
currency required to purchase local or foreign assets (e.g., capital controls
affecting nonresident accounts and resident foreign exchange accounts). TM
An initial list of 18 events has been obtained from the International
Monetary Fund's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions. if the announcement dates for the identified events are not
in this source, then they have been collected from The Wall Street Journal.
An event is dropped from the list if its announcement date could not be
found. Likewise, events are dropped from the initial list if multiple
announcements of changes in investment restrictions occur within less
than six weeks of each other. Five events, all of which happen to entail
a liberalization of international investment restrictions, satisfy the preceding
criteria. A description of these events is provided in Appendix A.2,62 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Tests of the Effects of Changes in International Investment
Restrictions
This section describes the procedure for testing whether
announcements of changes in the foreign investment restrictions in the
Philippines are associated with changes in the FPF's premiums or
discounts. 15
If the existing international investment barriers prior to the regulatory
changes are effective, an announcement of a liberalization of investment
restrictions should be associated with an increase in the discount of the
FPF. The null hypothesis is that announcements of liberalization of
international investment restrictions in the Philippines do not affect the
FPF's discounts. The alternative hypothesis is that announcements increase
the discount of the fund. We only consider the impact of announcements
related to a relaxation of investment restrictions since all of the events
in the sample happen to involve some form of liberalization.
We test this hypothesis using the regression model:
ApD t = .13 o + j_lnlt + .132D2, + J33D3,+ ct
Here APDt is the change in the fund's discount in week t. The dummy
variable Dlt= 1 if t is between two and seven weeks before the announcement
and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable D2t= 1 if t is between one week before
and one week after the announcement and 0 otherwise. The dummy
variable D3t= 1 if t is between two and seven weeks after the announcement
and 0 otherwise. _6 A three-week window is used as the event period in
order to reduce the potential for bias in the estimates of the coefficients
in Equation (1) due to the effects of nonsynchronous trading, lagged
reporting of the fund's price and NAV and a possible lagged reporting of
the event itself. Table 1 shows that there are some positive and statistically
significant noncontemporaneous cross-correlations between the fund's
share price changes and changes in NAV. In particular, the statistically
significant cross-correlation coefficient of 0.14 at lag -1 indicates that a
change in the fund's share price over one week predicts the change in
the fund's NAV over the next week. In the same manner, the cross-UNITE AND BEVERIDGE:CAPITALMARKETLIBERALIZATION 2.63
Table 1: Sample Cross-Correlations Between Fund Share Price Changes and Net
Asset Value Changes of the FPF Closed-end Country Fund Computed
Using Weekly Data from March 30, 1990 to December 29, 1995"
0,o
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -I 0 i 2 3 4 5
0.03 0,01 0.06 -0.02 0.14 0.54 0,23 0.04 0,2 -0.01 -0.08
[.(1,26)(0.55) (0.10) (1.05) (O.3O)(2.4S)* (11.07)* (4.0S)* (O.64) (3,4S)* (O.25) (1,42) (0.89)
*Figures in parentheses are t-ratios
The superscript a denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
correlation coefficient of 0.23 at lag i suggests that a change in the NAV
over one week predicts the change in the fund's share price over the next
week. These are consistent with reporting lags or nonsynchronous trading
which cause recorded prices and NAVs to respond to new information at
different times. 17
The parameters JSI, J_2, and J33 measure the effects on the FPF's
discount changes of announced changes in international investment
restrictions in the Philippines. The coefficient b I measures the average
weekly change in the fund's discount prior to the announcement of
regulatory changes. The coefficient b2measures the average weekly change
in the fund's discount during the three-week period surrounding the
announcement. The coefficient _3 measures the average weekly change in
the fund's discount after the announcement. These parameters are estimated
using ordinary least squares and their statistical significance are determined
based on Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard errors and t-statistics
which are robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.18 Holding all
other things constant, the coefficient b2should not be significantly different
from zero under the null hypothesis. On the other hand, under the
alternative hypothesis, this coefficient should be negative and statistically
significant if the barriers to international investments that existed before
the announced liberalizations have effectively restricted foreign access to
the Philippine capital market.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 2 shows the results of estimating Equation (1). The estimate
of the coefficient f12 indicates that, on average, an announcement of a264 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
relaxation of investment restrictions in the Philippines is associated with
a 0.45 percent increase in the fund's discount. However, while the
estimate of the coefficient ag2 is of the expected sign, the null hypothesis
that the announcement has no effect on the fund's discount during the
three weeks surrounding the announcement cannot be rejected at the
conventional level.s of significance. This result suggests that U.S. investors
do not react to the announced liberalizations during the event period.
Table 2 also reports the results of testing the null hypotheses that
discounts do not increase during the weeks before and after the
Table 2: Test of the Effect of Changes in Philippine International Investment
Restrictions on the FPF Closed-end Country Fund Discount Using
Weekly Data from March 30, 1990 to December 29, 1995 a
ZIPDg Po+ P,D ,,+_ D_,,q- _D ,,+ g,
where .4PD is the change in the FPF's discount in week t
DI_ = 1 if t is between two and seven weeks before the announcement of a
loosening of the Philippines' investment restrictions and 0 otherwise
D=_ = 1. if t is between one week before and one week after the announce-
ment of a loosening of the Philippines' investment restrictions and 0
otherwise
D_L = 1 if t is between two and seven weeks after the announcement of a











Figures in parentheses are t-ratios for tests of the hypotheses _>0 against the alternative
that _,<0, i=0, 1, 2, 3, based on OLS regression with standard errors computed using the
Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and 3rd-order serial correlation.UNITE AND BEVERIDGE:CAPITALMARKET LIBERALIZATION 265
announcement period. The hypothesis is that _61>0 cannot be rejected at
the conventional levels of significance, indicating that U.S. investors do
not react prior to the announcement period. Likewise, the hypothesis is
that J_a>O cannot be rejected at the conventional levels of significance,
suggesting that there is no delayed response to the announced regulatory
changes. 1,)
Overall, the results indicate that U.S. investors do not respond to
the aggregate announcement of relaxations in international investment
restrictions during the sample period. This finding suggests either that
U.S. investors perceive the prior restrictions as ineffective or that they view
the announced regulatory changes as unimportant (i.e., not a significant
or major relaxation of existing restrictions) or both.
However, these suggestions are counterintuitive to commonly accepted
wisdom. In particular, we are less inclined to believe that the announcement
effect was insignificant only because U.S. investors view the prior restrictions
as ineffective. The following anecdotal evidence and stylized facts seem to
favor more the possibility that U.S. investors perceive the prior restrictions
as effective deterrents to directly investing in Philippine listed securities.
For example, prior to the major liberalization of the Philippine
foreign investment policy in November 1991, foreign investors perceived
the then existing restrictions as impediments to foreign investments. In
particular, foreign investors expressed that the foreign equity ownership
restrictions of the Philippines were the most stringent among ASEAN
countries (Unite 1995). In fact, foreign participation was limited to 40
percent of equity in most businesses prior to this policy change. Ownership
restrictions were most often effective for these firms since most companies
that fall into these restricted areas generally classify their shares into two
categories: "A" shares and "B" shares. The effectiveness of this restriction
is evidenced by the fact that the Central Bank of the Philippines can
monitor stock purchases by foreigners as they are legally allowed only to
purchase "B" shares. Moreover, the Central Bank requires that such
acquisitions be registered in order to qualify for repatriation of dividends
and the proceeds resulting from subsequent sale.
On the other hand, unlike firms, banks are heavily regulated (see
e.g., Lamberte and Llanto 1995). Before the liberalization of the banking266 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
sector, entry of foreign banks and equity ownership of domestic banks and
financial institutions by foreigners were highly regulated by the Central
Bank of the Philippines via the General Banking Act and other laws under
the supervision of the Central Bank. In contrast with publicly traded non-
bank firms, almost all publicly traded banks do not follow the "A" share
- "B" share convention as a means of complying with the foreign equity
restriction. Instead, they "float a sufficiently small percentage of their
shares so that even if all those floated shares were purchased by foreigners
it would not violate foreign ownership restriction" (Rodrigo 1993). 20
Finally, under prior foreign exchange regulations, repatriation of
capital and remittance of dividends and interest require approval by the
Central Bank and were staggered from three to nine years. In fact, it took
four to six months before approval was given and transactions were settled
(Lamberte and Llanto 1995). The rules also stipulated that "while waiting
for reinvestment or repatriation, divestment proceeds of duly registered
foreign investment as well as cash dividends, interest payments and
divestment proceeds of stock dividend/splits were allowed to be placed
only in government securities, shares of stock of BOI-registered industries
and shares of stock in Central Bank-certified export-oriented industries
with prior Central Bank approval" (Lamberte and Llanto 1993). 2_It seems
reasonable to infer that, because of their bureaucratic nature and their
associated opportunity costs, the prior rules and regulations are costly
and may be perceived as effective impediments for individual U.S. foreign
investors who wish to directly invest in the Philippine stock market. 22
A possible reason then for these counterintuitive results is as
follows. Previous studies using closed-end country funds to gauge the
impact of capital market liberalization have concentrated on analyzing the
effect of the aggregate announcements of such regulatory changes. It is
possible that when such studies found insignificant announcement effects,
it could have been because they did not differentiate between
announcements which were more likely to be important to foreign investors
wishing to directly participate in the domestic stock market and those
which were not. 2_Therefore, it is possible that a significant announcement
effect is observed only if the restrictions are effective and at the same time
if U.S. investors perceive the announced liberalization of the restrictionUNITE AND BEVERIDGE:CAPITALMARKETLIBERALIZATION 267
as important (i.e., a significant or major relaxation). Consequently, the
prior international investment restrictions in the Philippines may have
been effective but the significant effect of important announcements on
the FPF's discount changes were washed out by the insignificant effects
of announcements which were deemed unimportant by investors. This
possibly resulted to the overall announcement effect being insignificant
when all announcements were considered collectively. We discount the
possibility that the announced changes were fully anticipated since the
pre-announcement coefficient was found to be insignificant.
In order to test this hypothesis, we classify the events in the sample
into three groups: (a) announcements related to a major relaxation of
foreign equity participation limits via the Foreign Investment Act of 1991
(events dated 6/6/91 and 6/22/94), (b) announcements related to the
relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions (events dated 1/3/92 and 8/
10/92), and (c) announcements related to the liberalization of entry of
foreign banks to operate in the Philippines which is not covered by the
Foreign Investment Act of 1991 (event dated 10/14/94). Although both
involve a major relaxation of foreign equity participation limits, the last
category was treated separately from the first one because it applies more
to direct equity investors, who seek a degree of control over the local
company, than to individual portfolio investors.
The new regression model is:
APD,._ ao + a2FIA2+ a3FIA3t+ a4FX1t+ asFX2t + a6FX3, + aTBKlt
+ asBK2, + agBK3,+ ut
As in Equation (1), ADPD is the change in the fund's discount in week
t. The F/Airs represent the dummy variables for the announcement of a
liberalization of the foreign equity participation limits in economic areas
other than banking. The FXis are the dummy variables for the
announcement of a liberalization of foreign exchange restrictions. The
BKts are the dummy variables for the announcement of liberalization of
entry of foreign banks. The values that these dummy variables take, for
i = 1, 2, and 3, follow those of model (1). Longer windows for the pre- and268 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
post-announcement periods were also considered but they produced similar
results.
The coefficients a2, as and a8 measure the average weekly change
in the fund's discount during the three-week period surrounding the
announcement of regulatory changes in foreign equity participation limits
on economic areas other than banking, foreign exchange restrictions, and
foreign banks entry restrictions, respectively. The coefficients al, a4 and
a7 measure the average weekly effect on the fund's discount before the
announcement of regulatory changes on foreign equity participation limits
on economic areas other than banking, foreign exchange restrictions, and
foreign banks entry restrictions, respectively. The coefficients a3, a6 and
a9 capture the effects of changes in the fund's discount after the
announcement of regulatory changes on foreign equity participation limits
on economic areas other than banking, foreign exchange restrictions, and
foreign banks entry restrictions, respectively.
Table 3 summarizes the results of estimating Equation (2). The
estimate of the coefficient a 2 indicates that during the three-week event
period, an announcement of a liberalization of foreign equity participation
limits in economic areas other than banking is on average associated with
a 1.53 percent increase in the fund's discount. The Newey-West adjusted
t-ratio suggests that the "null hypothesis that the announcement of a
relaxation of foreign equity participation restrictions has no effect on the
fund's discount during the three weeks surrounding the announcement
can be rejected at the 1 percent level of significance.
On the other hand, although the estimate of the coefficient
corresponding to announcements of relaxation of foreign exchange
restrictions, as, is of the expected sign, it is statistically insignificant,
suggesting that announcement of a liberalization of foreign exchange
restrictions has no effect on the fund's discount during the three weeks
surrounding the announcement. Meanwhile, the estimate of the coefficient
corresponding to the announcement of the liberalization of entry of foreign
banks in the Philippines, as, is positive, contrary to what is expected.
However, this estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant, suggesting
that the announcement of the liberalization of entry of foreign banks in
the Philippines has no effect on the fund's discount.UNITE AND BEVERIDGE: CAPITAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION 269
Table 3: Tests of the Effect of Changes in Philippine International Investment Restrictions
by Category of Regulatory Change on the FPF Closed-end Country Fund Discount
Using Weekly Data from March 30, 1990 to December 29, 1995 "
Z_D,= or,, + Ot,FIA.,+ Ot2FIA_, +(Z_FIA_ ,+(z4FX.,+(zsFX_, + _cFX_,+ OtTBKt, + ot.BK2,+ ot_,BK_, + u,
whcre APD is the change in the FPF's discount in week t
F/At= 1 if t is between two and seven weeks before the announcement of a loosening
of the foreign equity participation limits in economic areas other than banking
and 0 otherwise
FIAt,= i if t is between one week before and one week after the announcement of a
loosening ofthe foreign equity participation limits in economic areas other than
banking and 0 otherwise
FIAa,= 1 ff t is between two and seven weeks after the announcement of a loosening of
the foreign equity participation limits in economic areas other than banking
and 0 otherwise;
FXI, = i ff t is between two and seven weeks before the announcement of a loosening
of the foreign exchange restrictions and 0 otherwise
FX_ = 1 if t is between one week before and one week after the announcement of a
loosening of the foreign exchange restrictions and 0 otherwise
FXar = 1 ff t is between two and seven weeks after the announcement of a loosening of
the foreign exchange restrictions and 0 otherwise
BKt, = i if t is between two and seven weeks before the announcement ofliberalization
of entry of foreign banks and 0 otherwise
BK2_= I if t is between one week before and one week after the announcement of
liberalization of entry of foreign banks and 0 otherwise
BK3_= 1 ff t is between two and seven weeks after the announcement of liberalization























" Figures in parentheses are t-ratios for tests of the hypotheses a_O against the alternative that a_ <0, i=0,
1,2.....9, based on OLS regression with standard errors computed using the Newey-West(1987) correctioa
for heteroscedasticity and 3rd-order serial correlation,
The superscript _ denotes significance at the 0,01 level,270 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
For each group of announcements, the results of testing the null
hypothesis that the fund's discounts do not increase during the weeks
before the event period are also reported in Table 3. The hypotheses that
a130, a4a0 and a730 cannot be rejected at the conventional levels of
significance. These results suggest that changes in Philippine investment
restrictions on each of the three groups of announcements have not been
anticipated by U.S. investors. They also indicate that the insignificant
effects for announcements related to regulatory changes in foreign exchange
restrictions and liberalization of entry of foreign banks are not a consequence
of the announcements having been anticipated by U.S. investors. Likewise,
the null hypotheses that the FPF's discounts do not fall during the weeks
after the event period for each group of announcements are also tested.
The null hypotheses that a3>0, a6>0 , or ag>0 cannot be rejected at the
conventional levels of significance indicating that there is no delayed
response to each group of announcements.
The finding of a significant effect for announcements related to the
relaxation of foreign equity participation in most areas of economic activity
other than banking suggests that U.S. investors view these regulatory
changes as important and the existing restrictions as effective. In fact, the
passage of the Foreign Investment Act of 1991 which opened virtually all
areas of economic activity to up to 100 percent foreign ownership is
considered as the most resolute step taken by the Philippine government
to reverse its once unfriendly attitude towards foreign investors.
On the other hand, the insignificant effects of announcements
related to the liberalization of foreign exchange restrictions and relaxation
of restrictions on entry of foreign banks suggest that U.S. investors
perceive the announced changes as relatively unimportant. The earlier
discussions provide the rationale why we are less inclined to believe the
alternative that the effects of these groups of announcements are statistically
insignificant because U.S. investors find the prior restrictions as ineffective.
A possible reason that U.S. investors may have perceived the
announced relaxation of the foreign exchange restriction is as follows.
Prior to the announced foreign exchange liberalization which allowed full
and immediate repatriation of foreign investment proceeds without need
for prior approval by the Central Bank of the Philippines, full repatriationUNITE AND BEVERIDGE:CAPITALMARKETLIBERALIZATION 271
and remittance privileges for foreign investments were already allowed
though on a staggered basis and subject to approval by the Central Bank.
In addition, foreign investors still have to deal with rigorous reporting
requirements that remain despite the regulatory change. For example,
Euromoney (1996) cites the inefficiencies associated with the remaining
reportorial process. 24
On the other hand, the announced liberalization of entry of foreign
banks effected via a purchase of 60 percent of the voting stock of an
existing domestic bank or through a new banking subsidiary incorporated
in the Philippines may have been viewed by individual portfolio investors
as unimportant. This is because banking liberalization mostly affects
institutional investors who seek control of the domestic enterprise through
direct investment rather than individual portfolio investors who seek
potential global diversification benefits via country funds. Bodhurta et al.
(1995) document that as of December 1990, institutional ownership in the
First Philippine Fund constitute only 12 percent of the total shares of the
fund. Therefore, the insignificant announcement effect of banking
liberalization possibly reflects the perceptions of the individual investors
of the FPF who represent the majority. Alternatively, U.S. investors may
have perceived this announcement to be of minor importance relative to
the announced opening up of other sectors of economic activity. These
inferences do not imply, however, that individual investors do not prefer
to hold portfolio investments in the banking sector. Appendix B lends some
support to the preceding inferences. It shows that the percentage of the
net assets of the FPF in common stocks of banks have been growing
between 1991 and 1995, especially in the year after the announcement
of banking liberalization. However, it constitutes only under 20 percent
of total net assets of the fund compared to the 80 percent share of net
assets in nonbank common stocks as of June 30, 1995. This is reflected
also in the percentage distribution and growth rates of total inward
portfolio investments in the Philippines. An examination of the annual
total inward portfolio investments in approved government/listed securities
from the Foreign Exchange Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
shows that investment in the banking sector constitute only 11.61 percent
of the total inward portfolio investments in 1995 compared to 86.49
percent for the nonbanking sectors.272 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
The events in the sample were also classified simply into two groups:
announcements related to the liberalization of foreign equity participation
limits (Foreign Investment Act of 1991 and banking liberalization combined)
and those related to a liberalization of foreign exchange restrictions. The
regression model for this alternative classification of events is:
zlDPD t= Yo+ y1FIABKj_ + y2FIABK2t + y3FIABK3 t+ y4FXlt + y_FX2t + y6FXjt +
17 c
/IDPD t represents the change in the fund's discount in week t. The FIAB_ts
represent the dummy variables for the announcement of a liberalization
of foreign equity participation limits in general. The FXits are the dummy
variables for the announcement of a liberalization of foreign exchange
restrictions. The values that these dummy variables take, for i = 1, 2, and
3, follow those of model (1). Similar results were found when longer
windows for the pre- and post-announcement periods were used.
The coefficients /'2 and ys measure the average weekly change in
the fund's discount during the three-week period surrounding the
announcement of regulatory changes in foreign equity participation limits
and foreign exchange restrictions, respectively. The coefficients h and Y4
measure the average weekly effect on the fund's discount before the
announcement of regulatory changes on foreign equity participation limits
and foreign exchange restrictions, respectively. The coefficients Y3and g0
represent the effects of changes in the fund's discount after the
announcement of regulatory changes on foreign equity participation limits
and foreign exchange restrictions, respectively.
The results, reported in Table 4, are similar to those of the second
model, though weaker in terms of statistical significance. The estimate of
the coefficient g2 indicates that, on average, an announcement of relaxation
of foreign equity limits in general is associated with a 0.93% increase in
the discount of the FPF country fund during the three week period
surrounding the announcement. This announcement effect is statistically
significant at the 0.10 level, which is relatively weaker than when
announcements related to the Foreign investment Act of 1991 are classified
in a different group. On the other hand, the estimate of the coefficient
corresponding to the announcement of relaxation of foreign exchange
restrictions, Ys, is positive, contrary to what is expected. However, thisUNITE AND BEVERIDGE: CAPITAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION 273
Table4: Testsof the Effect of Changes inPhilippine International Investment Restrictions byCategory
of Regulatory Change onthe FPF Closed-end Country Fund Discount UsingWeekly Data
from March 30, 1990 to December 29, 1995"
APD= _,+ y,FIABK,+ _FIABK2,+ y,FIABK_+ _FX,+ _FX_,+ _/_A_a+ /7,
where APD, is the change in the FPF's discount m week t
FIABK_,= 1if t is between two and seven weeks before the announcement of a loosening
ofthe foreign equity participation limits m economic areas including banking
and 0 otherwise
FIABK2= 1 if t is between one week before and one week after the announcement of a
loosening of the foreign equity participation limits m economic areas includ-
ing banking and 0 otherwise
FIABK3= 1 if t is between two and seven weeks after the announcement of a loosening
of the foreign equity participation limits in economic areas including and 0
otherwise;
FXl, = 1 if t is between two and seven weeks before the announcement of a loosening
of the foreign exchange restrictions and 0 otherwise
FX2, = 1 ff t is between one week before and one week after the announcement of a
loosening of the foreign exchange restrictions and 0 otherwise
FX3, = 1 if t is between two and seven weeks after the announcement of a loosening

















"Figures in parentheses are t-ratios for tests of the hypotheses 7_30 against the alternative
that y_<0, i=0, 1,2,...,6, based on OLS regression with standard errors computed using the
Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and 3rd-order serial correlation.
The superscript ***denotes significance at the 0.10 level.2,74 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
coefficient is statistically insignificant. The test of the hypothesis that the
fund's discounts rise during the weeks prior to the announcement period
for each group of announcements, i.e., ),1>0 and 74>0, cannot be rejected
at the conventional levels of significance. This implies that the
announcements are not anticipated by investors. Likewise, there are no
indications of delayed response to the announced regulatory changes as
indicated by the nonrejection at the conventional levels of significance of
the null hypotheses that y3>0 and 76>0.
The finding that announcements related to the relaxation of foreign
equity participation limits is significant suggests that the existing barriers
in this category effectively restrict foreign investors access to the Philippine
equity market. However, that the announcement effect is weakly significant
when the banking liberalization is included in the announcements related
to the Foreign Investment Act of 199 1 implies that the impact on the fund's
discount is stronger only when the foreign equity ownership other than
banking is relaxed.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we investigate the impact of liberalization of
international investment restrictions in the Philippines on the discounts
of the First Philippine Fund closed-end country fund. We test whether
announcements of changes in investment restrictions are associated with
changes in the fund's premiums and discounts. If the barriers to
international investments are effective, announced liberalizations of
restrictions should reduce the premium or increase the discount of the
country fund.
The overall results suggest that there is evidence supporting the
hypothesis that changes in the FPF's discounts are associated with
announcements of changes in international investment restrictions.
However, although there are indications that the existing barriers are
effective, a significant relationship appears to hold only when
announcements are deemed important by U.S. investors. Specifically, the
results suggest that announcements of liberalization of investmentUNITE AND BEVERIDGE:CAPITALMARKETLIBERALIZATION 2?5
restrictions that limit foreign equity participation in areas of business
other than banking and financial institutions are significantly associated
with an increase in the fund's discount. On the other hand, the
announcements related to the relaxation of foreign exchange restrictions
(in particular the removal of restrictions on the ability of foreign investors
to repatriate investments and dividends) and liberalization of entry of
foreign banks to operate in the Philippines seem to be viewed by individual
portfolio investors as relatively unimportant. There are no indications that
the investors fully anticipate these announcements.
The findings of the study provide evidence that Philippine barriers
to international investments represented by foreign equity ownership limits
in most economic activities have been effective and that announced
liberalization of this restriction is deemed important by U.S. investors.
The results also indicate that the foreign equity ownership restriction has
been effective in segmenting the Philippine equity market. One implication
of this evidence is that, all else constant, foreign equity ownership
restrictions raised the required return on Philippine equities. To the extent
that Philippine companies finance new investment projects through the
stock market, ownership restrictions increased the cost of capital for the
domestic firms. Therefore, the finding that the FPF's discount increases
with the liberalization of ownership restrictions implies a reduction in the
cost of raising capital in the Philippine stock market,
Sourcing of funds to finance investment projects is one of the
critical problems faced by a developing economy like the Philippines. As
a consequence, the country has pursued liberalization programs aimed at
developing the domestic capital market and mobilizing domestic resources.
The removal of market barriers in the financial sector through various
liberalization measures has created direct as well as indirect impacts on
the inflow of foreign funds into the country. The direct effects are quite
obvious but we have shown the potential indirect effects. The significant
relationship estimated between news on liberalization measures and the
movement of returns on a fund that has underlying peso-denominated
financial securities establishes this indirect impact. The continuance and
consistency of liberalization measures have the potential of making peso-2"76 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
denominated assets attractive in the international capital market. This
attractiveness, in effect, creates additional demand for peso-denominated
assets, which, in turn, may raise funds for various investment undertakings.
Thus, macroeconomic measures make an impact on financial features of
firms viewed from the international capital market, it is therefore imperative
on the part of Philippine policymakers to pursue consistent macroeconomic
policies as well as to continue the liberalization programs.
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NOTES
1 Nondiversified means that the country fund is not limited by the U.S. Investment
Company Act of 1940 in the proportion of its assets that it may invest in the
securities of a single issuer (Standard & Poors 1989).
2 This restriction on foreign equity participation was relaxed with the implementation
of the Philippine Foreign Investments Act of 1991. This measure virtually opened
all economic sectors to 100 percent foreign equity ownership, except in those
areas specified in a transitory negative list. A key feature of the FIA is the negative
list of sectors where foreign investment would be limited to a maximum of 40
percent, but free to invest in all other sectors without prior approval from authorities.
On October 1991, a three-year transitional period went into effect during which
foreign ownership was restricted to a maximum of 40 percent in sectors specified
in the transitory negative list. The issuance of Executive Order No. 182 in June
1994 effectively deleted List C of the transitory negative list. Foreigners can now
fully own businesses in areas such as insurance, travel agencies, wholesale trading,
convention organizing, and manufacturing under foreign licenses.
3 It must be noted, however, that not all companies follow this "A" and "B" share
convention. Exceptions include (a} companies that are not involved in restricted
areas of business and do not own land and (b) companies that float a sufficiently
small percentage of their shares so that even if all those floated shares were
purchased by foreigners it would not violate foreign ownership restriction (Rodrigo
1993). As a result of the liberalization of foreign equity restrictions, firms that
have recently listed their shares rarely resort to this share classification.
4 In addition, the international asset pricing models of Black (1974) and Stulz (1.981)
provide implications on the relationship between barriers to international
investments and country funds' price-to-NAV ratios. However, the models of Eun
and Janakiramanan (1986) and Hietala (1989) seem to capture better the nature
of investment restrictions in the Philippine equity market. Black (1974) and Stulz
(1981) assume that international investment barriers take the form of a tax on
holdings of foreign risky assets by domestic investors that make it costly to hold
foreign securities relative to domestic securities. The restriction essentially places
a limit on the amount of capital that domestic investors can export. Both models
predict that the expected return on long positions on tbreign assets will exceed the
expected return on a domestic asset of the identical risk by the rate at which such
holdings are taxed thereby ensuring that after-tax expected returns on the two
assets are the same. The closed-end country funds, whose underlying shares are
foreign risky assets, are analogous to long positions on foreign risky assets indirectly
taken by domestic investors while the country funds' shares themselves can be
considered as domestic assets of about the same risk. Therefore, these models
suggest that international investment restrictions that make it costly for a domestic
investor to hold foreign assets relative to domestic assets will increase the required
return on the country funds' underlying assets relative to the required return on
the funds' shares themselves. Consequently, the imposition of effective or binding
restrictions in a country will increase the price-to-NAY ratio investing in that country
by an amount related to the tax exacted.
s Chang, Eun and Kolodny (1995), Johnson, Schneeweis and Dinning (1993), and
Diwan, Errunza and Senbet (1993) provide evidence of international diversification
benefits through investment in closed-end country funds, especially in funds
devoted to emerging markets' securities.UNITE AND BEVERIDGE: CAPITAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION 2.81
6 Stylized facts seem to support this argument. For example, Mullin (1993) reports
that during the mid-1980s, closed-end country funds were the primary, and in
some cases, the only available, means through which foreign portfolio investors
'purchased' emerging market equities. The issuance of such funds peaked in
1990 at US$3.4 billion and then declined to US$1.2 biIlion :in 1991. This decline
was in contrast to the observed rapid increase in international placements and
direct equity portfolio inflows during the same period. He cites that an apparent
reason for the dampened demand for closed-end country fund shares and
acceleration of direct equity portfolio inflows can be attributed to capital market
liberalization reforms instituted by several developing countries, which reduced
the impediments to direct equity purchases by foreigners. To support this argument,
Mullin {1.993) provides an inventory of liberalization of restrictions on foreign access
to the equity markets of developing countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, mid India which occurred during the
period 1989 to 1992.
7 It should be noted that there are other country funds devoted to investing in
Philippine securities and which are traded in the London stock exchange, it would
have been interesting to examine how European investors view the announced
changes in the international investment restrictions in the Philippines as well.
However, data on these country funds were not readily available.
s Although the FPF was listed on November 8, 1989, it began trading only on No-
vember 15, 1.989 (Standard & Poors 1990}.
3 The New York Stock Exchange operates from 0930 to 1600 New York time. The
operating hours of the Philippine stock exchange is from 0930 to 1200 local time
or 2000 to 2300 of previous day New York time. The market is open from Monday
through Friday in both exchanges.
l0 The gaps in the plot correspond to the weeks of April 5, 1991, November 27, 1992,
and March 3,1995, respectively, when the fund did not report its NAV. The proce-
dure for estimating these missing values is discussed in Note 13.
t l Note, however, that investments in Philippine equities represented 57.3 percent of
net assets of the fund as of June 30, 1991 and at 96.2 percent as of June 30, 1995
(Standard & Poors NYSE Stock Reports, 1991 and 1995).
t2 Hardouvelis et al. (1994) examine the extent to which the noise-trader model of
asset prices (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman 1990) can explain the
empirical regularities of the weekly price behavior of 35 country funds that traded
on the New York and American stock exchanges between 1986 and 1993, A fea-
ture of the noise trader model is the variation in the demand of noise traders
arising from shifts in sentiment or misperceptions of fundamental value, Among
other things, they find that, like their domestic counterparts, country funds are
typically issued at a premium and that the premium declines by approximately 20
percent over the 24 weeks lbllowing the initial public offering. They argue that this
is consistent with the predictions of the noise-trading model. One prediction of
this model is that a new fund will be issued only when sentiment for the fund is
high. The premium at the initial offering of a country fund is then explained by the
ability of fund organizers to time the issuance of funds to coincide with positive
fund investor sentiment {e,g., bullish investor sentiment for a country). On. the
other hand, the subsequent deterioration in the premium is explained by mean-
reversion in fund investor sentiment.
la We estimate the three missing observations based on this adjusted sample. The
procedure is based on Beveridge's (1992) extension of the linear least squares282 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
interporlator. An advantage of this technique over the earlier procedures of esti-
mation of missing values is that it can handle any pattern of nonconsecutive
observations. First, the NAVs are adjusted to include dividends and capital gains
distributed during the period. Per closed-end fund reporting conventions, divi-
dends and capital gains axe deducted from reported NAV when the shares go ex-
dividend and not on the dividend payment date. Secondly, autoregressive (AR)
models were estimated for the NAV series immediately prior to the first missing
observation. Similarly, AR models were estimated for the series of NAV immedi-
ately after the first missing observation up to the observation immediately before
the second missing observation and for the series of NAV immediately after the
second missing observation up to the observation immediately before the third
missing observation. Using the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), an AR(1) was
found to be the best model in each case. In each case, the estimate of the AR(1)
coefficient is significant and very close to 1 and the residual autocorrelations of
the estimated model are all statistically insignificant at the 0.01 level. These sug-
gest that the NAV series follows a random walk. To confirm this, each series was
first differenced. The autocorrelations of each of the first difference series are all
statistically insignificant. Therefore, the best estimate (minimum mean squared
error) of each of the three missing values is obtained by taking a simple average of
the NAV observations, with dividends and capital gains payments included, im-
mediately before and after the missing value and then deducting the dividends
and capital gains payments.
14 Direct investments axe investments which give the investor some degree of control
over the funds invested (e.g., acquisitions of 10-25% of voting shares of a corn-
party) while portfolio investments are not afforded such control (e.g., purchases of
bonds and equity ownership of less than 10-25% of voting shares) (International
Monetary Fund 1977).
is We will only refer to discount changes and not premium changes for the rest of the
paper. The reason for this is that the FPF consistently traded at a discount over
its NAV during the period under study.
16 A similar model is employed by Bonser-Neal et al. (1990). Prior to estimating
Equation (1), the fund's discount changes axe adjusted to remove any dividend/
capital gains payment announcement effect and ex-dividend/capital gains effect.
The details of the adjustment procedure axe discussed in Appendix B of Bonser-
Neat et al. (1990). Four discount changes are adjusted because they cover dividend
announcement and ex-dividend periods. The adjusted discount change series has
about the same mean though slightly higher standard deviation than the unadjusted
discount change series. The mean of the adjusted discount change series is -
0.030 compared to -0.033 for the unadjusted series. The standard deviation of the
adjusted discount change series is 3.035 compared to 2.998 for the unadjusted
series. We also estimate Equation (1) using the unadjusted discount changes but
there is a very minor difference in the results compared to those reported in this
paper.
17 Bonser-Neal et al. (1990) and Bodurtha et al, (1995) argue that the positive cross-UNITE AND BEVERIDGE: CAPITAL MARKET LIBERALIZATION 283
correlations in the price and NAV of country funds could be an artifact of
nonsynchronous SP and NAV measurements due to the timing differences between
the foreign country stock market and the NYSE. As mentioned earlier, there is a
17-hour difference between the Philippine Stock Exchange close and New York's
close. This might introduce a bias in the results if the event window is confined to
the announcement week. The potential for bias can be illustrated as follows. As
discussed in the Theoretical Framework, ceterisparibus, the introduction of binding
restrictions will increase a country fund's price-to-NAV ratio above the level
prevailing in the absence of such restrictions by approximately the amount the
investor is willing to pay to avoid the restrictions. For example, the Philippine
government announces a relaxation of its foreign investment restrictions. Since
the removal of investment barriers that reduces the cost for the U.S. investor of
directly holding Philippine equities will reduce the required return on the fund's
underlying assets relative to the required return on the fund's shares, the price
and NAV of the FPF will rise in response to the announcement. If the prevailing
restrictions prior to the announced liberalization are binding, the fund's price-
NAV ratio will fall; i.e., the fund's premium decreases or the discount increases.
However, if NAVs are reported with some lag, the fund's price will change before its
NAV changes and the fund's premium will rise (discount will decrease) in the
announcement week. The decrease in premium (or increase in discount} would
only become evident the following week, when both the fund price and its NAV
would have completely adjusted.
i8 The sample autocorrelations of the first 6 lags of the changes in percentage discounts
for the FPF are -0.19, -0.07, -0.12, -0.03, -0.03 and 0.01, respectively. The first-
and third-order autocorrelation coefficients are found to be significant at the 0.05
level wl_ile coefficients at higher-order lags are all insignificant. These suggest that
the residuals of regression model (1), as well as the other models considered in
this study, are likely to be serially correlated. The pattern of the regression models'
sample residual autocorrelations confirms our initial diagnostics. For Equation
(1), the sample residual autoeorrelations for the first 6 lags -0.20, -0.05, -0.14,
0.00, -0.05, and 0.03. Only the first- and third-order autocorrelation coefficients
are significant at the 0.05 level. The higher-order (beyond the sixth-order)
autocorrelation coefficients are all statistically insignificant. The sample residual
autocorrelations for the first 6 lags of Equations (2) and (3) and their significance
are identical to those of Equation (1). Likewise, the higher-order sample
autocoiTelation coefficients of Equations (2) and (3) are all statistically insignificant.
It is also possible that, as a result of the various liberalization announcements,
the fund's discount changes may not be homoscedastic. Consequently, we employ
a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix of the OLS estimates based on the procedure proposed by Newey
and West (1987).
i9 The results of using longer pre- and post-announcement w'.'ndows are not very
much different from those reported here.
2o In fact, among the 10 publicly traded banks in 1991, only one bank (Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation) has an "A" share - "B" share classification. The
rest had unclassified shares,284 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
21 Under the new rules and regulations covering foreign investments in Central Bank-
approved securities, any proceeds from an investment may be temporarily deposited
in a bank prior to repatriation, and any interest earned on the deposit can
automatically be remitted without further registration (Euromoney 1.996)_ Also,
transactions related to foreign investment in Central Bank-approved securities
can now be settled in three to four days (Lamberte and Llanto 1995).
22 An anonymous referee argued that it is also possible that the prior restrictions
may have been viewed by U.S. investors as ineffective because of the administrative
weaknesses and monitoring inefficiencies in the regulatory agencies of the Philippine
government such as the Central Bank. These flaws in the supervisory and regulatory
mechanisms were exposed during the Asian financial crisis that commenced in
July 1997. We feel that this is a very valid argument. However, we don't think
that this is the prevailing view among foreign investors during our sample period
that covers the year 1989 to 1995. In fact, almost all investment guides and other
publications that analyze the foreign investment environment in the Philippines
that we have surveyed emphatically stress on the previously mentioned restrictions
to international investments in the country and create an impression among
potential foreign investors of the seriousness of such restrictions. These
publications mostly cater to foreign investors and are published abroad (see e.g.,
George 1991; Rodrigo 1993; Hinkelman 1996; and Euromoney 1996). For example,
Euromoney (1996) reports that "The Philippines has benefited from the large
amounts of investment recently directed towards emerging markets in general
and towards south-east Asia in particular. While the Philippine government has
welcomed this interest in the country, it has maintained rigorous reporting and'
regulatory controls over foreign funds. This ensures that the government :is aware
of where investment is being directed and that it would be forewarned if the inflow
were to reverse."
23 For example, Bonser-Neal, et al. (1990) find the effect of aggregate announced
regulatory changes to be insignificant in the case of the Taiwan Fund.
24 "Generally, the Bangko Sentral Registration Document (BSRD) is issued by a cus-
todian bank for investments in approved government/listed securities. To pur-
chase foreign currency from the custodian bank for repatriation of the investment
proceeds, a broker's sales invoice must be presented. If the foreign currency is
purchased from a different bank, the investor must ask the custodian bank to
provid_ a BSRD letter advice, which authorizes the remitting bm_k to use all or
part of the BSRD. This process is inefficient, manually time-consuming and pa-
per intensive. Frequently the bank that is selling the foreign currency for repatria-
tion must delay payment, as it does not receive the BSRD from the custodian
bank. The custodian bank may not be able to provide the BSRD as it is awaiting a
certificate of inward remittance from the bank that originally sold pesos to the
investor. Remittances of cash dividends must be accompanied by a schedule show-
ing the names and addresses of the investor, the BSRD of the securities involved,
and the gross- and after-tax amounts of the dividend, as well as a board resolution
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Appendix A: Chronological Listing of Announcements of Changes
in Philippine International Investment Restrictions
10/14/94. The entry of foreign banks to operate in the Philippines
was liberalized (Circular No. 51). Such entry can be effected through a
purchase of 60 percent of the voting stock of an existing domestic bank or
of a new banking subsidiary incorporated in the Philippines or through the
establishment of branches with full banking authority, subject to the
licensing requirements of the Central Bank. For a foreign bank branch
(new or already established), permanently assigned capital of the dollar
equivalent of P210 million (converted at the exchange rate of P26.979 per
US$1 - the rate prevailing on June 5, 1994) must be remitted and converted
into pesos, which will allow for the establishment of three branches. For
each three additional branches to be opened, the U.S. dollar equivalent of
P35 million must be remitted. (IMF 1995): Direct investment, loosening,
capital inflows.
6/22/94. President Fidel Ramos opened the Philippine economy wider
to overseas businesses. The executive order is part of a foreign-investment
liberalization that takes effect Oct. 24. Non-Filipinos will be able to own
businesses in many sectors that now are restricted to 40 percent foreign
ownership. Foreigners will be allowed to operate in areas such as insurance,
travel agencies, wholesale trading, convention organizing, manufacturing
under foreign licenses, and cockfighting. The easing isn't expected to affect
the economy much initially, but it underscores Mr. Ramos's determination
to increase competition in protected areas, despite small companies' claims
of hardship. The National Economic and Development Authority said that
'adequate capacity' is not a sound basis for excluding foreign investments
in a particular sector. It said restricting competition benefits high-cost
producers at consumers' expense. (WSJ 6/23/94): Direct investment,
loosening, capital inflows.
8/10/92. The Philippines will scrap most remaining foreign-exchange
restrictions. Businesses and analysts welcomed the move but urged further
deregulation of trade and foreign-investment policies. President Fidel Ramos
said the measures, the second stage of an overhaul launched late the last
year, will remove requirements that exporters sell their foreign-exchange
earnings to banks. Under the package expected to take effect this month,
Philippine residents may borrow as much as $1 million from banks for2,86 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
investment abroad without central bank approval and may hold overseas
deposits. Gold imports won't require central bank authorization and most
gold exports will be allowed. The first stage, widely considered, incomplete,
required 15 types of enterprises, ranging from airlines to oil companies and
including most foreign-exchange earners, to sell almost all these earnings
to banks for resale to the central bank. The latest move encouraged
businesses, which said it removed psychological blocks to investment and
could encourage Filipinos abroad to repatriate more earnings. (WSJ 8/11/
92): Foreign exchange accounts, loosening, capital outflows.
1/3/92. Central Bank of the Philippines issued rules/regulations
liberalizing nontrade foreign exchange transactions, including investment
related transactions. With respect to foreign investments, the major policy
changes entailed the broader coverage of foreign investments, the
liberalization of repatriation and remittance privileges and the reduction as
well as simplification of reportorial and documentary requirements. Under
CB Circular No. 1318, foreign investments are defined to include investments
by a resident in foreign exchange or its equivalent in assets actually brought
into the country, as contrasted to the definition under the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991, which considers the nationality or citizenship of
the investor. Full and immediate repatriation and remittance privileges for
all types of duly registered investments, whether as direct equity or in listed
shares/securities and regardless of the type of industry or sector where
investment were made are now allowed to be directly serviced by AABs
[Authorized Agent Banks which include all categories of banks (except
offshore banking units) duly licensed by the Central Bank] without prior
CB approval. This is in contrast to previous guidelines where full and
immediate repatriation was allowed only for registered investments in CB-
certified export-oriented industries and in CB-approved securities, but is
otherwise staggered for investments in other industries from three to nine
years, depending on the type of industry and sectoral priority where
investments were made. However, under Section 40 of Circular No. ].3].8,
repatriation of investment financed through the debt-to-equity program
under Circular No. 1111 dated August 26, 1986, Revised Circular No. 1111
dated October 20, 1982 and Circular No. 1267 dated December 20, 1990,
shall be governed by said Circulars or any subsequent alnendments thereto.
(IMF 1.993, WSJ 1/7/92): Foreign exchange accounts, loosening, capital
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6/6/91. The Philippine Congress approved a bill allowing foreigners to
own as much as 100 percent of most businesses in the country, now lim-
ited to 40 percent. The measure, to be signed into law in November, is also
aimed at generating jobs for Filipinos. Separately, Manila will seek to bor-
row $100 million from the Asian Development Bank for relending to small
and medium industries. Meanwhile, the government will probably shed 80
percent of its holding in Philippine Airlines in a single phase this year in-
stead of gradually. (WSJ 6 / 7 / 91): Direct investment, loosening, capital in-
flows. (note: need updating)
Appendix B: Percentage Distribution of the Net Assets of the First
Philippine Fund •
As of As of As of As of As of
6/30/1.991 6/30/1992 6/30/1993 6/30/1994 6/30/1995
In common stocks of firms in:
Banking 2.0 7.0 8.0 10.5 16.4.
Telecommunications 18.7 22.8 14.6 16.1 13.3
Food m_d Beverage 12.0 17.4 18.6 22.7 21.2
Conglomerates 0.2 8.6 8.0 8.2 11..3
Electric Utilities Nil 7.0 11.6 14.5 12.7
Real Estate
Development 3.2 6.8 10.0 8.6 10.9
Other 19.8 9.9 16.4 12.8 10.4
Total Common Stocks 57.3 83.2 87.2 93.4 96.2
Net assets are based on market value.
Source: Standard & Poors NYSE Stock Reports {1991-1.995)